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Summary
The extent to which Asia's choice of exchange rate regime affects Europe's exposure to US shocks is a pertinent issue to examine at present for two reasons. First, a number of commentators have suggested that the United States' large current account deficit is unsustainable and will likely unwind (perhaps caused by shocks in the US). Second, the Chinese authorities have made a number of suggestions over the past year that they might allow greater flexibility in the exchange rate movements of the renminbi.
We use a three-country model, symmetrically calibrated for the US, Europe, and Asia, to analyse the effects on Europe of US shocks, and compare two cases:
(1) when the currency of the Asian bloc is pegged to the US dollar (2) when the Asian currency freely floats against both the US and European currencies
Our model captures several channels by which shocks in the US affect aggregate demand for Europe's output. First, any shock that raises US consumption, increases US demand for worldwide, and thus Europe's output -the aggregate world demand effect. Aggregate demand for Europe's output is further affected by the consequent reaction of consumption in Europe and consumption in Asia. Second, aggregate demand for Europe's output depends not only on aggregate world consumption, but also on the allocation of consumption across countries, because households are biased towards consuming domestic products. Hence, a unit increase in consumption in Asia has a different effect on demand for Europe's output than a unit increase in consumption in Europe. Third, the allocation of consumption over time (consumption smoothing) also affects the demand for Europe's output. The strength of these channels will depend in part on the choice of the exchange rate regime.
Our results show that Asia's choice of the exchange rate regime does not significantly affect Europe's exposure to US shocks in the case of some shocks (namely the demand shock and the productivity shock in the US traded goods sector), but has a significant effect in case of other shocks (namely the productivity shock in the US non-traded goods sector).
When nominal exchange rates cannot be used as a buffer for shocks, Asian firms react to shocks originating in the US by implementing large price adjustments (since prices now have to do all the work) and this, in turn, strongly affects Europe's relative competitive position. This adjustment is especially pronounced after a shock occurring in the US non-traded goods sector. Our model shows that the adjustment of Asian prices initially dominates the other effects induced by the pegging of the Asian currency. Overall, the fixed exchange rate in Asia increases the exposure of output and inflation in Europe to shocks originating in the US. This result suggests that, if China eventually decided to float her currency, Europe's exposure to US shocks would decrease.
But our results also indicate that, for a reasonable calibration, the overall volatility of Europe's output and inflation depends mainly on domestic, and not foreign, shocks. Therefore, even these significant changes in Europe's exposure to US shocks, following China's floating, might not have large effects on the overall volatility of Europe's inflation and output.
Introduction
The international economic environment has been dramatically transformed in recent years by increasing global financial integration and by the rapid growth of several Asian economies. Both events profoundly affect macroeconomic interdependence. For example, as China evaluates whether to continue having a fixed exchange rate against the dollar or to allow the renminbi to float, many commentators have asked what the consequences of this decision will be for the other countries in the world economy. In other words, both economic commentators and policymakers recognise that the configuration of the international monetary system (which is determined by exchange rate arrangements) affects the international transmission of shocks.
At the broad level of simplification, one could characterise the international monetary system as consisting of three large blocs: the euro, the US dollar, and a bloc of Asian currencies that have been fixed (to varying degrees) against the dollar. 1 Given the size of the Asian bloc, the choice of exchange rate regime in Asia may affect the transmission of shocks between the US and the euro bloc. This is because any US shock triggers an immediate reaction from the Asian central banks if the latter are pegging their currencies, 2 whereas if their exchange rates are floating then Asian central banks do not necessarily need to take action.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse how Europe's output and inflation respond to shocks originating in the US, and compare two cases: (1) when Asia pegs her currency to the dollar, and (2) when the Asian currency freely floats. We choose to investigate the transmission of US shocks to Europe because the empirical literature has found that Europe is more affected by US shocks than vice versa (Artis, Osborn and Perez 2004) . To conduct our analysis we use a three-country model that parallels the Centre-Periphery model of Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini and Tille (2000) , which we extend by adding a non-traded goods sector in each country, by introducing dynamics, and by adding exogenous supply and demand shocks.
At least since Friedman's (1953) pioneering contribution, 3 there has been a vigorous debate on the impact of exchange rate regimes on the international transmission of shocks. We aim to contribute to this debate from an entirely different perspective. Rather than analysing how the choice of exchange rate regime in one country affects its exposure to foreign shocks, we analyse how the transmission of shocks between two countries is affected by the choice of the exchange rate regime in a third country.
To our knowledge, there are no other papers that analyse this issue directly, although some studies have, in a more indirect manner, looked into it. For example, using a three-country model, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) show that, in the event of an unspecified shock that balances the US current account, the euro area effective (trade-weighted) real exchange rate would appreciate more if Asia kept her exchange rate pegged to the dollar, than if Asia decided to float. Our aim is to expand their analysis in a number of ways: (1) by using a dynamic setting, (2) by specifying the nature of the shocks, and (3) by looking at the effects of the regime choice on other variables.
The three-country model in this paper has imperfectly substitutable consumption goods, a traded and a non-traded goods sector in each country, nominal rigidities, and a monetary policy authority. We consider only supply (productivity) and demand (consumption preference) shocks originating in the US. Using both impulse responses and variance decompositions, we examine the transmission of these shocks to Europe under two scenarios: when Asia pegs her currency to the dollar, and when the Asian currency freely floats.
Our main result is as follows. If Asia keeps her exchange rate pegged to the dollar, both output and inflation in Europe respond more to US shocks. This happens because, in the absence of nominal exchange rate adjustments, Asian firms react to the US shocks by implementing large price changes that strongly affect Europe's relative competitive position. Importantly, the impulse responses show that the adjustment of Asian prices is especially pronounced after a shock occurring in the US non-traded goods sector. This particular finding is very robust to changes in various parameter values.
Asia's adoption of a fixed peg vis-à-vis the dollar has two important consequences for the transmission of US shocks to Europe. Firstly, if the Asian currency is pegged to the dollar, the nominal interest rate in Asia must move in line with the US nominal interest rate. Secondly, US shocks do not only affect the euro-dollar bilateral exchange rate, but they also affect the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis the Asian currency. However, our general equilibrium model shows that the large adjustment in Asian prices initially prevails over these two effects.
The rest of the paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 presents the model, while Section 3 discusses the calibration of the parameter values. Section 4 analyses the transmission of each considered US shock to Europe, and Section 5 examines the impact of Asia's choice of exchange rate regime on volatilities of Europe's output and inflation, and its exposure to US shocks. Section 6 conducts some sensitivity or robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
To conduct our analysis we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. It consists of three countries or regions, namely Europe (E), the US (U) and Asia (A). We assume that
Europe has size γ E γ P , the US has size γ P -γ E γ P , and Asia has size 1 -γ P . 4 The agents in the economy are households, firms, and governments. Households in each country consume a variety of differentiated goods, each produced by a single monopolistic firm. Each firm produces only one good, which can be either traded or non-traded. In each country, a continuum of traded and a continuum of non-traded varieties are produced. The size 5 of the traded and the non-traded goods sectors in each country is constant.
Goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption. Households in each country first allocate their expenditure between traded and non-traded goods, and then they allocate their expenditure between traded goods of different countries. Finally, households allocate their expenditure among all the traded and the non-traded individual goods varieties.
Nominal rigidities are modelled by assuming that firms pay a nonlinear adjustment cost whenever they change their prices, as in Ireland (2001); moreover, prices are sticky in the producer's currency. 6 We consider only supply (productivity) and demand shocks. 
Households
Households derive utility from an index of consumption goods (C), real money balances (M/P) and leisure (1 -H). The representative household in country j (j = E, U or A) has the following lifetime utility function:
where β is the discount factor and j ω is a country-specific exogenous stochastic process that affects consumption preferences. We interpret a shock to this process as a 'demand' shock. 8 The parameters 4 The countries are named only for expositional purposes. Further details are available in the calibration section. 5 The size of a sector is the measure of goods produced, or firms operating, in that sector. 6 Thus, we do not consider the case of local currency pricing. The price of any country's traded good is identical in all countries (the law of one price holds), but the non-traded goods sector and the home bias in preferences imply that purchasing power parity does not hold. 7 Restricting the number of shocks certainly facilitates the analysis, but on the other hand it may go at the expense of realism. For this reason we decide to keep a limited but sufficiently 'representative' menu of shocks, by assuming that uncertainty can either originate from the supply or the demand side of the economy.
ξ , χ and ϕ are positive and assumed to be equal in all countries. We also assume that labour can freely move across sectors, and households can contemporaneously supply their labour to the traded and non-traded goods sectors. Total hours worked H are given by the sum of hours worked in both the traded (T) and non-traded (N) goods sectors:
are aggregates across firms in each sector.
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Households can smooth their consumption by buying or selling the domestic and the foreign non-statecontingent nominal bonds. They can also invest in money holdings (M), but not in physical capital. We also introduce a small quadratic cost of holding bonds, 10 which ensures stationarity of the model and a well-defined steady state. 11 The budget constraint of the representative household in country j at date t is: C are consumption sub-indices that represent, respectively, the total consumption of traded and non-traded goods, and α is the share of traded in total goods. Households in each country first allocate their expenditure on traded goods between country A's goods and the bundle formed by E and U goods, which together make up the periphery (P), 13 then between E and U traded goods:
The elasticities of substitution µ (between T and N goods) , ρ (between A and P traded goods), and ψ (between E and U traded goods), and the weights α, γ P and γ E are the same for all countries. The parameters h E , h U and h A are free and allow us to introduce home bias in consumption.
14 The consumption sub-indices for the individual varieties are given by similar CES aggregators, with the same elasticity of substitution θ for the traded and non-traded goods sectors in all countries. A higher θ 12 Households pay the cost of holding bonds to financial intermediaries located in their own country, and firms pay the cost of adjusting their prices to the issuers of new 'menus'. We assume that financial intermediaries and the issuers of menus are located in each one of the three countries and are owned by households, therefore, we add to the budget constraint an allinclusive lump-sum rebate or rent R j . implies higher substitutability among individual varieties. Therefore θ is inversely related to the degree of monopolistic competition in the goods market.
P , and j T A P , denote the price indices that match up the consumption aggregators illustrated above. The price indices are defined as the minimal expenditures needed to buy one unit of corresponding consumption bundles -they are obtained in the standard way from the household's preferences.
Firms
Each firm is a monopolistic supplier of a single differentiated product, which is produced using labour as the only input. The firms' production function is affected by an exogenous productivity shock, common to all firms in the same sector. Since we abstract from physical capital, and regard it as fixed in the short run, we assume that the marginal productivity of labour is decreasing.
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The production functions of the individual firms sector-specific exogenous processes that affect the productivity of labour. We interpret the shocks to these processes as 'supply' shocks. The parameter ζ measures the elasticity of output with respect to labour, and we assume it to be equal across sectors and across countries. Since labour is completely flexible between sectors, traded and non-traded sector firms pay the same hourly real wage rate j W .
Prices adjust sluggishly to changes in demand. In particular, we assume that firms have to pay a nonlinear adjustment cost whenever they want to change their prices. For example, a firm E T z , operating in Europe's traded goods sector, will choose the price of her own differentiated good by maximising profit:
consumption between European and US goods, which could be justified by the similarity of the industrial structure ('new' goods in both Europe and the US, 'mature' goods in Asia). π is country j's gross inflation rate at date t. We abstract from the specification of an optimal rule, and set the inflation target equal to its steady-state gross rate j π . When Asia pegs her currency to the dollar, her monetary policy rule is simply replaced by the requirement to maintain the peg.
Calibration
We conduct our analysis using a calibrated version of the model, choosing the structural parameters from the literature, with the aim of approximating the salient features of the US, European and Asian economies. Our main reference for the calibrated parameter values is Obstfeld and Rogoff's threecountry model (2005), but we also conduct a sensitivity analysis in Section 6. All the calibrated parameter values are symmetric across countries, and reported in Table 1 . Exogenous processes:
Std deviations: Europe
Std deviations: US
Because of the uncertainty about the properties of the shocks and the values for the parameters that appropriately characterise Europe, US and Asia, we prefer to make only minimal restrictions. In Section 6 we check whether our main results are robust to changes in parameter values. In this way, although our research is largely motivated by China's present dilemma over fixed or flexible exchange rates, we are also able to assess whether a third country's choice of exchange rate regime can affect the transmission of shocks between any two other countries in general terms.
Since the model cannot be solved in closed-form, we obtain our results by means of a numerical approximated solution. In particular, we find the steady state of the nonlinear model using Mathematica, 18 and then we use DYNARE to compute the first-order approximate solution of the model, the impulse response functions, the second-order moments and the variance decompositions.
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The discount factor β is set so as to yield an annual real interest rate of four percent in the steady state, and the risk aversion parameter C ξ is taken from Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) . The parameter φ is calibrated so that in the steady state the fraction of time that households in all countries or regions spend working is 0.31. Then, given this choice of average hours worked in the steady state, the parameter H ξ is calibrated so that in the steady state the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is equal to 1, the value suggested by Galí, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005) . The interest rate feedback rule makes the money demand equation redundant (money demand adjusts automatically to money supply), therefore the parameters χ and M ξ need not be calibrated.
The parameters γ E and γ P govern the 'size' of the three regions in the model, with γ E denoting the size of Europe and γ P denoting the combined size of Europe and the US. In particular, both γ E and γ P simultaneously accomplish several roles within the model, since they give the measure of households, firms and product varieties in each region, in addition to being the weights of the consumption indices for traded goods. Therefore, γ E and γ P could be calibrated using population data, GDP data, or trade data, leading to very different calibrations. 20 Because of this ambiguity we decide to take a 'neutral' or intermediate stance, and we assume that all regions have the same size, and that all other major parameters are symmetric across all countries, but we conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to γ E in Section 6. This approach has an additional benefit -keeping the major parameters same across all countries allows clearer understanding of the transmission mechanism, because, following the US shock, the only difference between Europe's and Asia's reaction is due to their different choice of the exchange rate regime.
The critical parameters in the model are µ, the elasticity of substitution in consumption between traded and non-traded goods, ψ, the elasticity of substitution between European and US traded goods, and ρ, given our choice of country weights γ E and γ P . The share of traded goods α is based upon the estimates of Spange and Zabczyk (2006) , and the parameter θ is taken from Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
However, since the elasticities of substitution, the degree of home bias and the share of traded goods in total consumption are crucial for the transmission of shocks across countries, we conduct extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters in Section 6.
The elasticity of output with respect to hours, ζ, is calibrated so that, given the mark-up, 23 in the steady state the share of wages in the value of output is equal to 0.7, a value that is taken from Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) . Our choice of the price-adjustment cost parameter φ is based upon the estimates of
Ireland (2001), while η, the parameter that governs the size of the bond-adjustment costs, is taken from Ghironi and Melitz (2005) .
The coefficients of the interest rate feedback rule, j i ρ and j π ρ , are set in accordance with the IMF calculations. 24 We too assume that these coefficients are the same across countries or regions, and in Section 6 we conduct some sensitivity checks.
We decide to adopt an 'agnostic' approach, and assume that the exogenous processes that affect demand and productivity are the same across countries. They are all assumed to follow stationary AR(1) processes with zero mean, and the shocks to these processes are uncorrelated. Our research question is restricted to be the analysis of how the transmission of US shocks to Europe is affected by the choice of the exchange rate regime in Asia. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, we decide to abstract from all shocks originating in Asia.
The autoregressive parameters are taken from Benigno and Thoenissen (2003), and Neiss and Nelson (2003) . We normalise the standard deviations of the two productivity shocks as being half the standard deviation of the demand shock, so as to avoid giving more importance to either demand or supply shocks. Finally, we choose the standard deviations of the two demand shocks so as to approximate the standard deviation of output and inflation in Europe and the US. 21 Since the possibility of modelling the substitutability between European and US goods separately from the substitutability of Asian goods is missing in Obstfeld and Rogoff's three-country model, we set ψ equal to ρ in our benchmark. 22 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) assume that US, European and Asian households attach a weight of 0.7 to their own domestic products. Moreover, Europe and the US place a weight of 0.1 on each other's traded goods and a weight of 0.2 on Asian goods. On the other hand, Asia places a weight of 0.15 on both Europe and US' traded goods.
The transmission of US shocks to Europe
In this section we explain how sector-specific productivity shocks and demand shocks originating in the US are transmitted to Europe's output and inflation, and how the transmission is affected by Asia's choice of exchange rate regime. For each shock we first describe the international transmission mechanism when all three currencies freely float against each other, a situation that we call the floating scenario. Then we examine how the international transmission mechanism changes when we allow Asia to peg her currency to the dollar, a situation that we call the hybrid scenario, because different exchange rate regimes coexist.
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The impulse responses for the main macroeconomic variables described in the previous sections are presented in the appendices. We also present the responses of the three bilateral real exchange rates and the three bilateral terms of trade, which are defined as follows:
For example, a rise in
RER , is an increase in the price of Europe's consumption basket relative to the US consumption basket, therefore we say that Europe's real exchange rate appreciates and the US real exchange rate depreciates. A rise in
ToT , is an increase in the price of Europe's traded goods relative to US traded goods, therefore we say that Europe's terms of trade improves and the US terms of trade deteriorates.
Since ours is a general equilibrium model, all the variables are interrelated and the channels that allow the shocks to have an effect on the world economy can be numerous. However, as far as the transmission across countries is concerned, our analysis is greatly facilitated by the recognition that in our model there are only two sources of international linkages, namely trade and the asset market.
The international transmission through trade can be summarized as follows. In addition to having other direct effects in the country of origin, a given shock will change the demand or supply of that country's traded output. Since in our model prices are set in the producers' currency and prices are costly to adjust, these changes will affect the demand for that country's currency. Thus the nominal exchange rate and the competitiveness of the other countries' traded goods will be affected by the shock. As a result, output in the other two countries changes as well. 23 Our choice of θ implies a steady state mark-up of prices over marginal costs of approximately 14%. 24 See "Globalization and External Imbalances", Chapter 3, World Economic Outlook, April 2005. 25 One could think of a third scenario where Asia pegs to a basket of currencies that include both dollar and euro with equal weights -the Basket scenario. This scenario is simply an average of the two examined scenarios.
Furthermore, a shock originating in one country will affect her desired intertemporal allocation of consumption, and therefore her demand or supply of the internationally traded bonds. For example, a country that wants to increase future consumption will start lending and thereby have a higher demand for bonds. Since bonds are in zero net supply worldwide, the adjustment towards equilibrium in the asset market will require changes in the cost of borrowing and bond holdings in the other two countries, which in turn will affect their intertemporal allocation of consumption. We recover this mechanism by examining the changes in the real interest rates, which we define as follows:
The above definition of the real interest rate is useful because consumption growth in country j is positive (negative) whenever j t r is positive (negative).
27 Thus, changes in j t r capture the international transmission of the shock through the asset market.
For the purpose of clarity, we can summarise trade and asset market channels by an example that explains how shocks in the US affect aggregate demand for Europe's output. First, any shock that raises US consumption, increases US demand for worldwide, and thus Europe's output -aggregate world demand effect. The aggregate demand for Europe's output is further affected by the consequent reaction of consumption in Europe and consumption in Asia. Second, aggregate demand for Europe's output depends not only on aggregate world consumption, but also on allocation of consumption across countries, because households are biased towards consuming domestic products. Hence, a unit increase in consumption in Asia has a different effect on demand for Europe's output than a unit increase in consumption in Europe. Third, the allocation of consumption over time (consumption smoothing) also affects the demand for Europe's output by changing its pattern over time, and thus by changing the volatility of demand. The strength of many of these channels depends on the choice of the exchange rate regime.
Throughout the analysis, we describe the transmission of each shock originating in the US by means of a simple step-by-step approach. First, we describe its direct effects on the US economy. Then, we examine its consequences for trade and for the asset market, and from those consequences we explain why we get the observed responses of output and inflation in Europe. The main interest of this analysis lies in the interpretation of the results presented in Section 5: without an understanding of the transmission mechanism, we would not be able to explain and determine the limits of our findings.
Positive productivity shock in the US traded goods sector
Floating scenario 28 The positive productivity shock in the US traded goods sector directly affects the US economy. To begin with, all the firms operating in the traded sector enjoy higher productivity of labour, and therefore lower real marginal costs. Under monopolistic competition and sticky prices, prices are a function of expected future marginal costs. Therefore, the positive productivity shock, which reduces marginal costs, causes a fall in the US tradable price index, which is also accompanied by an increase in traded output. Because of the increase in traded output, the US aggregate income or GDP increases. Lower prices and higher income stimulate households' demand, therefore consumption increases in the US.
Secondly, US firms in the traded sector react to the increase in productivity by shrinking their workforce. The resulting fall in labour demand causes a fall in wages, therefore marginal costs fall also for the firms operating in the non-traded sector, because the model assumes there is a common wage rate across the traded and non-traded sectors. As a result, prices fall also in the non-traded sector. Since prices of both non-traded and traded goods decrease, US CPI inflation falls. The US monetary authority reacts by cutting the nominal interest rate, thus US consumption demand receives a further boost from monetary policy.
Moreover, the shock is transmitted to the other countries through trade and the asset market. The higher US consumption will push up demand for all goods, and thus increase international trade. But, since US firms now sell at lower prices, international trade is further affected; in particular, world demand now switches towards the cheaper US traded goods. As a result, the demand for dollars increases, causing a nominal depreciation of the other two currencies. The appreciation of the dollar 29 then causes a decline in the US price of imports, and adds to the fall of CPI inflation in the US.
The asset market is also affected by the traded productivity shock. In order to spread the benefit (in terms of higher consumption) of the shock into the future, US households lend money abroad and the US current account becomes positive. Real interest rates fall in the other two countries. 30 Low real 28 Impulse responses are presented in Appendix A. 29 However, the actual behaviour of the dollar exchange rate also depends on the magnitude of the response of the US monetary policy. In our benchmark, monetary policy actually causes an initial and short-lived depreciation of the dollar, but US domestic prices still fall. 30 This is caused by the higher supply of money coming from the US. There are, however, very short-lived initial increases in Europe and Asia's real interest rates, because of falling inflation rates.
interest rates induce the foreign households to fund their current consumption by borrowing from the US. As a result, consumption in both Europe and Asia increases.
The response of European output depends on the relative strength of several factors. 31 On the one hand, the worldwide increase in consumption and the depreciation of the euro stimulates production. On the other hand, world demand switches towards the cheaper US traded goods. We can see from Appendix A that the latter effect prevails, since output in Europe falls. 32 It is also important to recall that, under the floating scenario, Europe and Asia are perfectly symmetric. Therefore the positive productivity shock in the US traded sector affects them in the same way.
Finally, under monopolistic competition and sticky prices, domestically-set prices depend only on current and future expected marginal costs, which in our set-up depend on both wages and the level of output. 33 After a positive productivity shock in the US traded sector, marginal costs decrease in both Europe and Asia. This, plus the fall in the US traded prices, explains the decrease in domestic (and CPI) inflation rates in both countries, which in turn induces their central banks to cut the nominal interest rates. However, since Europe and Asia do not benefit from the direct effect of the productivity shock on domestic prices, their fall in inflation rates and the subsequent expansionary responses from the monetary authorities are milder than in the US.
Hybrid scenario
Under the hybrid scenario, the direct effects on the US economy of the positive productivity shock in the US traded goods sector are the same as before, but the international transmission changes. Now, in order to preserve the fixed exchange rate against the dollar, the nominal interest rate in Asia must fall to the same level as the US nominal interest rate. Although in principle this could have implications for the transmission of the shock through the asset market, we can see from the impulse responses that bond holdings in the three countries are affected in a very similar way under the two scenarios; moreover, the responses of consumption in Europe and the US are also very similar. Therefore, we can infer that, in the case of this shock, Asia's choice of exchange rate regime does not have a major influence on the intertemporal allocation of consumption in the other two countries, and that in practice the transmission of the shock through the asset market is not significantly affected. 31 As the maximisation problem of the firm illustrates for the special case of traded goods, the factors that affect output demand are the relative prices and the domestic and foreign consumption of European goods. 32 At later stages, output increases and consumption decreases in both Europe and Asia, so as to generate enough resources to repay their borrowing. 33 In our set-up, the level of output affects marginal costs in two ways. Firstly, the marginal productivity of labour is decreasing in output. Secondly, higher output itself implies higher labour demand, and therefore higher wages.
The source of the differences in the responses of European output and inflation under the hybrid scenario are the international trade flows. Because the Asian currency cannot depreciate vis-à-vis the dollar, it must appreciate vis-à-vis the European currency. Naturally, these nominal exchange rate effects influence the transmission of the shock through international trade. At first, we would expect an increase in the competitiveness of European traded goods in comparison with Asian traded goods, and an increase in Europe's output at the expense of Asian output. However, competitiveness and international trade flows are not only affected by nominal exchange rates, but also by relative prices. As we can see from the impulse responses, Asian traded goods inflation is more negative under the hybrid than under the floating scenario. This occurs because, in the absence of any nominal exchange rate adjustment Asian prices must fall in order for Asia to remain competitive. In this case prices take all the brunt of adjustment.
The marked fall of Asian prices helps to stabilise the US/Asia terms of trade, and allows Asian firms to stay competitive vis-à-vis the US, in the face of falling US prices and the fixed exchange rate. On the other hand, the marked fall of the Asian traded goods prices also works in the direction of increasing the price of European goods relative to Asian goods, thus eroding the competitive gain induced by the depreciation of the euro towards the Asian currency. Indeed, Appendix A shows that initially the Europe/Asia terms of trade increases rather than decreases. As a result, there is an expenditure switching effect away from European goods to Asian goods, which causes European output to fall initially more under the hybrid than under the floating scenario. Since output falls more, future expected marginal costs are lower, at least initially, thus explaining why domestic (and CPI) inflation in Europe falls more under the hybrid than under the floating scenario.
Nevertheless after several periods, the larger effective euro depreciation under the hybrid scenario increases the competitive position of Europe's traded goods, and this effect dominates in terms of the overall impact on Europe's output.
Overall, the large adjustment of Asian prices under the hybrid scenario initially increases output in Asia, and reduces output in Europe. But this effect is short-lived. After several periods, a higher effective euro depreciation increases the competitive position of the European traded goods sector, thus increasing its exports and rendering European output under the hybrid scenario higher than that under the fixed scenario. Nevertheless, Appendix A shows that in our calibration the quantitative difference between the output and inflation reactions in the two scenarios is tiny.
Positive productivity shock in the US non-traded goods sector
For the sake of concision, we prefer to analyse the transmission of the non-traded productivity shock mainly by explaining how it differs from the transmission of the traded productivity shock.
Floating scenario 34
The direct effect on the US of the positive productivity shock in the US non-traded sector is very similar to that of the traded productivity shock. Production increases and real marginal costs fall, triggering a reduction in the price of non-traded goods. Since the US economy now produces more output at cheaper prices, domestic consumption increases. US demand gradually switches to the relatively cheaper nontraded goods, thus causing a fall in expected future traded output and real marginal costs in the traded goods sector. As a result, US traded goods prices fall too. The fall in domestic (and as a result, CPI) inflation prompts the US central bank to lower the nominal interest rate.
As in the case of the traded sector productivity shock, the non-traded productivity shock is transmitted abroad through the asset market and trade. In order to spread the benefit of increased productivity and enjoy higher consumption in the future, US households start holding a positive amount of all bonds, while the other two countries start borrowing from the US. As a result, consumption and real interest rates in both Europe and Asia increase.
Moreover, since prices in the US traded sector are falling, there is more demand for US goods and the dollar appreciates (except for a small and short-lived initial depreciation), as it happened after the traded productivity shock. However, the non-traded productivity shock does not have a direct effect on traded prices, therefore the fall in US traded sector inflation is significantly lower than under the traded productivity shock, but it is more persistent. As a result, the appreciation of the dollar is stronger under the non-traded productivity shock than under the traded productivity shock.
Notwithstanding the increase in domestic consumption and the depreciation of the euro, European output falls, since demand switches towards the cheaper US traded goods. 35 However, European output recovers in subsequent periods.
Because of the decrease in wages and output, current and future expected marginal costs fall, therefore domestic (and CPI) inflation in Europe falls initially. The fall in inflation is short-lived because the depreciation of the euro increases the cost of imports. Moreover, as Europe's output levels start to grow so do her marginal costs and therefore prices.
34 Impulse responses are presented in Appendix B. 35 European traded output falls because worldwide demand gradually switches to the relatively cheaper US traded goods. Moreover, the fall in US traded prices causes a fall in the aggregate traded price index. As a result, European households consume less non-traded goods, and European non-traded output falls.
Hybrid scenario
In the previous section we saw that Asia's choice of the exchange rate regime did not significantly change Asia's bond holdings. This is not the case here. Following the non-traded productivity shock, Asia's borrowing is lower under the hybrid than under the floating scenario, and real interest rates in both Europe and Asia fall more. As a result, Europe's consumption initially increases more under the hybrid than under the floating scenario.
As it happened in the case of the traded productivity shock, the main driver of the differences in the responses of European output and inflation under the hybrid scenario is the lack of a depreciation of the Asian currency vis-à-vis the dollar, and the marked fall in Asian prices. 36 From Appendix B we can notice that in the hybrid scenario the fall in Asian prices and inflation rates (both traded and non-traded) is quite dramatic, except for a small and very short-lived initial increase. As before, this allows Asian traded sector firms to stay competitive vis-à-vis US firms.
Initially, the marked fall in Asian prices induces an expenditure switching effect from European and US goods to Asian goods. As a result, Europe's output must fall below the level that occurs under the floating scenario. Moreover, European wages also fall below the level that occurs under the floating scenario. As a result, expected future marginal costs are comparatively lower and prices in Europe fall more, thus explaining why domestic (and CPI) inflation rates in Europe initially fall below the floating scenario. Nevertheless, after several periods Europe's output benefits from the appreciation of the Asian currency, and thus European output and inflation gradually rise above the floating scenario.
By and large, the mechanism of the adjustment of inflation and output in Europe, following a nontraded sector shock in the US, is similar to that caused by the traded sector shock. The large fall in Asian prices initially reduces the competitive position of Europe's traded goods sector and thus her output and inflation, but the latter is recovered after several periods of greater effective euro depreciation. In contrast to the traded sector shock, however, the quantitative difference between the hybrid and floating scenario is now much larger.
Negative demand shock in the US
In this section we prefer to analyse the transmission of a negative, rather than a positive, US demand shock, since a negative demand shock has the same consequences on the European economy (fall in output and inflation) as the two positive productivity shocks. Although less detailed than Section 4.1, the explanation offered here follows the same step-by-step approach.
Floating scenario 37
A negative demand shock induces a decline of consumption demand in the US, and since output is demand-determined in the model, current and expected future output falls. Expected future marginal costs, which depend on both wages and output, are lower, so prices fall too. US monetary policy reacts by cutting the nominal interest rate.
The demand shock is transmitted to the other countries through the asset market and trade. Since the negative demand shock, as it is a preference shock, reduces the attractiveness of consumption, US households lend resources abroad. Real interest rates fall in the other two countries and borrowing becomes more attractive to European and Asian households, thus consumption rises in the other countries. But, at the same time the fall in US output reduces demand for European and Asian traded output. International trade is additionally affected since US firms now sell at lower prices. Thus, demand switches towards the US traded goods, and as a result the dollar appreciates, although only mildly.
As with the other shocks, the response of European output depends on the sign, and the relative strength, of the changes in all the variables that affect the demand for European output: relative price and domestic and foreign consumption demands. On the one hand, both the depreciation of the euro and the increase in domestic consumption stimulate the demand for European goods. But on the other hand, the fall in both US prices and US consumption reduces the demand for European goods. It is possible to infer from Appendix C that the latter two factors dominate, since Europe's output falls, although in the long-run it mildly increases.
In turn, falling output and lower wages imply lower current and expected future marginal costs, therefore European prices fall and inflation is negative. However, in subsequent periods inflation becomes mildly positive in all three countries.
Hybrid scenario
Asia's choice of exchange rate regime does not alter significantly the transmission of the demand shock through the asset market. This result can be inferred, similar to the case of the traded productivity shock, by noting that the responses of bond holdings are little different under the two scenarios. As before, the main driver of the differences in the responses of European output and inflation under the hybrid scenario is the lack of a depreciation of the Asian currency vis-à-vis the dollar, and the marked fall in Asian prices.
As with the two productivity shocks, under the hybrid scenario the Europe/Asia terms of trade initially increases, so Europe's competitive position towards Asia deteriorates, and Europe's output initially falls below the level that occurs under the floating scenario. Moreover, because output and wages fall more, current and expected future marginal costs are comparatively lower, therefore domestic (and CPI) inflation rates in Europe initially fall below the level that occurs under the floating scenario. However, euro depreciation against the Asian currency becomes a dominant effect after several periods, and Europe's output and inflation under the hybrid scenario increase above the floating scenario. It is important to note that the differences in the responses of the European variables between the two scenarios are again tiny under the demand shock. Table 2 reports the standard deviations of the main macroeconomic variables in the model, under the fixed and floating scenarios. The standard deviations produced by the model are roughly consistent with the data, except for the real exchange rate. However, the ability of sticky price models to reproduce the high volatility of the real exchange rates found in the data is a well-known problem in the literature.
The impact on volatilities and exposure to foreign shocks
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Notably, Asia's choice of exchange rate regime does not affect significantly the European business cycle, since the volatility of the main macroeconomic variables remains the same under both scenarios.
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In order to assess the overall impact of Asia's choice of exchange rate regime, we look at the variance decompositions of output and inflation, which are reported in Table 3 . The results show that if Asia keeps the exchange rate pegged to the dollar, Europe's exposure to US shocks increases, since the percentages of the variance of Europe's output and inflation that are due to US shocks are higher under the hybrid scenario than under the floating scenario. However, in our calibration, US shocks account only for a small percentage of the variances of Europe's output and inflation, and hence Europe's overall volatility is little affected.
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38 Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan's (2002) model generates real exchange rates that are as volatile as in the data, however, their result is influenced by their assumption that prices are set in the local, rather than the producer's, currency. 39 We do not aim to measure precisely the quantitative impact of Asia's choice of exchange rate regime on the total volatility of output and inflation in Europe. The major focus of our analysis is on qualitative rather than quantitative issues. 40 Very low exposure of euro area output and inflation to US shocks is also found in a recent empirical study by De Walque, Smets, and Wouters (2005). They estimate that US shocks account for only 0.2% of variance of euro area output, and 1.2% of variance of euro area inflation. Table 3 can be easily understood by means of the main results established in the analysis of the transmission mechanism. Consider, for example, a shock that causes US prices to fall, such as any one of the three shocks analysed in Section 4. In all three cases, at least for our calibration, output and inflation in Europe fall more, at least at impact, under the hybrid scenario than under the floating scenario. 41 Therefore, if Asia keeps her currency fixed against the dollar the responses of Europe's output and inflation after a US shock are amplified. Table 3 further shows that the main contribution to the higher exposure of Europe's output and inflation to US shocks comes from the non-traded productivity shock. There are two reasons for the major contribution of this shock. First, the non-traded sector in the US is twice as large as the traded sector. Hence, non-traded sector shocks have at least twice as large an impact as traded sector shocks, and consequently the reaction of the US monetary policy to non-traded shocks is much larger. Since the nominal interest rate in dollar-pegged Asia must equal the US nominal interest rate, the initial expansionary effect created by this lack of independent monetary policy in Asia is much larger. This increases the volatility of output and inflation in Asia, which partly transfers to the volatility of output and inflation in Europe. Second, the non-traded productivity shock does not affect directly US traded goods prices. Instead, its effect is slowly transmitted from non-traded to traded sector prices, rendering the latter more persistent. Under the floating scenario this more persistent reaction of US traded prices induces a very strong dollar appreciation. Therefore, under the hybrid scenario, Asian firms must respond by cutting their prices much more when faced with this persistent fall in US prices. As a corollary, we can also infer from the analysis of Section 4 that Asia's choice of exchange rate regime does not affect the responses of Europe's output and inflation to domestic shocks. Since Europe and the US are symmetric in our benchmark calibration, under the floating scenario the responses of European variables to US shocks are identical to the responses of US variables to shocks originating in Europe. 42 In the floating scenario, a shock originating in the US does not affect the Europe/Asia nominal exchange rate. Analogously, after a shock originating in Europe, the US/Asia nominal exchange rate does not change. As a result, the responses of European output and inflation to shocks originating in Europe are the same in the hybrid as in the floating scenario.
Sensitivity analysis
In order to check whether the results illustrated in Section 5 are robust to changes in the values of the parameters, we consider several departures from our baseline calibration. In this way, we are also able to assess whether our findings hold in general terms, for any group of three large countries in the world economy.
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Specifically, to conduct our sensitivity checks we analyse both the impulse responses and the variance decompositions obtained under alternative parameterizations of the model, which differ from the baseline calibration in respect of only one parameter at a time. To save space, we report only the variance decompositions in Table 4 . 44 Our results show that, under all alternative parameterizations, if
Asia pegs her currency to the dollar, Europe's exposure to US shocks is higher -the percentages of the variance of European output and inflation that are due to US shocks are always higher in the hybrid than in the floating scenario.
This is not the only robust result. One additional result that emerged from Section 5 was that the cause for the increase in Europe's exposure to US shocks is the behaviour of Asian prices in the hybrid scenario. Indeed, the impulse responses for our baseline calibration show that, whenever the Asian currency is pegged to the dollar, Asian firms respond to any shock that causes US prices to fall by markedly cutting their prices, and as a result, at least at impact, Europe experiences a higher loss of output demand if Asia pegs her exchange rate to the dollar. By analysing the impulse responses, we have found that the same happens in the alternative parameterizations considered in Table 4 . 45 Moreover, these impulse responses under alternative parameterizations also confirm that the difference between responses of Asian prices in the two scenarios is much larger in the case of a US non-traded productivity shock than with the other two considered shocks.
In summary, the following three results are very robust to changes in parameter values: 1) if Asia keeps her exchange rate pegged to the dollar, both output and inflation in Europe respond more to US shocks; 2) the amplification of the responses of European output and inflation is attributable to the behaviour of Asian prices in the hybrid scenario; 3) this amplification is always more marked in the case of US nontraded productivity shocks.
46 43 Since we did not perform a full econometric estimation of our model, we do not focus on a quantitative analysis, but rather on a qualitative analysis. 44 All impulse responses obtained under alternative parameterizations are available on request. 45 There are very few parameterizations (namely absence of home bias) where, after a traded US shock, European output falls less in the hybrid than in the floating scenario. But since this does not happen with the other two shocks, the general result that Europe's exposure to US shocks is higher in the hybrid scenario is also confirmed in these cases. 46 Both the transmission mechanism and the amplification under the hybrid scenario outlined in Section 4 are very robust among the parameterizations showed in Table 4 , with only a few exceptions that are quantitatively insignificant. Therefore, our three main results will also be robust to several changes in more than one parameter at a time. Inflation is defined as the quarter-to-quarter growth rate in the aggregate price level. The statistics are computed from logged and HP-filtered series, with λ = 1,600. The variance decompositions are computed by DYNARE using first-order approximations of the model.
Another result, which can be deduced from Table 4, is that changes in parameter values affect both the overall contribution of US shocks to the variances of European output and inflation, and the relative contribution of each US shock in comparison with the others. Hereafter, we discuss some of the more interesting examples.
30
The reason for a change in the overall contribution of US shocks is different in each parameterization.
For example, if α (the weight of traded goods in the consumption basket) increases, countries become more open. This implies that foreign demand becomes a larger component of the demand for European output. Analogously, more of the European consumption demand is spent on foreign goods. As a result, households across the world react more to a change in US prices, and thus Europe's output responds more to US shocks. In further examples, an increase in the contribution of US shocks to the variance of European output also occurs when the home bias parameter, h, falls (because a lower weight is attached to domestically-produced goods), when γ E falls (because a lower weight is attached to European goods), and when γ P increases (because it implies a larger size of the US, and thus the larger size of the initial shock).
Changes in parameter values also affect the relative contribution of each US shock in comparison with the others. For example, if the weight assigned to traded goods, α, increases to 0.5, the contribution of the traded productivity shock to the variance of European output becomes greater than the contribution of any other shock, at least in the floating scenario. This happens because, with α equal to 0.5, the response of European output to a US traded productivity shock is stronger than the response to a nontraded or a demand shock. 47 In further examples, an increase in the relative contribution of the traded productivity shock in comparison with the other shocks can also be observed when ψ increases or µ falls. On the other hand, the parameters that increase the relative contribution of the demand shocks in comparison with the other shocks are the home bias parameters, h, and the size of Europe's economy, γ E . When these are lower, less is spent on domestic or European goods, and the contribution of US demand shocks to the total variance of European output increases.
By and large, changes in parameter values alter Europe's exposure to each individual shock and to the sum of all US shocks. However, the main results presented in Section 5 are generally robust. Analogously, if Asia keeps the exchange rate pegged to the euro, both output and inflation in the US respond more to European shocks. Therefore, the transmission of shocks between two countries is dampened when a third country does not peg her exchange rate to one of their currencies.
Conclusions
One of the consequences of the emergence of the Chinese and several other Asian economies is that their macroeconomic policies will increasingly affect the rest of the world. This has been implicitly acknowledged, for example, in the recent academic and policy debate over China's choice of exchange rate regime.
Using a three-country dynamic general equilibrium model that extends the Centre-Periphery model of Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini and Tille (2000), we have analysed how the transmission of US shocks to Europe is affected by the choice of exchange rate regime in a third large country or a bloc of countries, which can be understood as either Asia or China, the largest Asian country.
We have found that, if Asia keeps her exchange rate pegged to the dollar, both output and inflation in Europe respond more to US shocks. This happens because, in the absence of nominal exchange rate adjustments, Asian firms respond to US shocks by implementing significant price changes that strongly affect Europe's relative competitive position. Our general equilibrium model shows that the adjustment of Asian prices initially prevails over the other effects induced by the pegging of the Asian currency.
It has often been argued that floating exchange rates have the benefit of insulating a country from foreign disturbances. Our results suggest that floating exchange rates have another insulating property: the transmission of shocks between two countries is dampened when a third country does not peg her exchange rate to one of their currencies. This result was obtained in a comprehensive framework, 48 and it has proved to be quite robust.
Our results have also revealed that, despite the increase in the exposure to US shocks, the impact of Asia maintaining her currency pegged against the dollar is likely to have only a modest effect on the overall volatility of Europe's output and inflation. This is because, at least in our calibration, US shocks account for only a small percentage of the variance of Europe's output and inflation.
We have aimed to provide a qualitative, rather than quantitative, analysis, and our focus has been limited to the transmission of US shocks. Therefore, we did not assess the relative importance of Asian shocks in the European business cycle. A successful answer to this distinct question rests, in our view, not only on a fully estimated dynamic macroeconomic model, but also on the availability of reliable time series for the Asian economies. 
